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BOOK REVIEWS

“A WAR NOT YET FINISHED”
Ricks, Thomas E. The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq,
2006–2008. New York: Penguin, 2009. 394pp. $27.95

Thomas Ricks begins his latest chronicle of the American strategic experience
in Iraq where he left off in Fiasco
(2006). In this account, Ricks uses his
familiar journalistic approach to describe how the civilian and military
leaders arrived at a change of policy and
strategy, commonly known as “the
surge,” in the war in Iraq. Ricks’s new
book appears to be more even in its
treatment of the leaders and the new
strategy than was Fiasco, with its prosecutorial tone. In spite of his upbeat assessment of the American leaders,
however, Ricks ends this volume with
measured, if not pessimistic, projections for the future of Iraq.

his watch, Odierno relied on Keane and
American Enterprise Institute strategist
Fred Kagan to change the direction of
the strategy in Iraq. They sought to
change the strategy of transitioning
power to corrupt and impotent Iraqi security forces into a new strategy of providing security for the Iraqi people. The
most remarkable aspect of Ricks’s story
is that this change in strategy developed
outside the president’s designated National Security team and against the
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs
and the Iraq Study Group. According to
Ricks, Keane and Kagan clearly led the
way in the White House to get more
American combat forces into Iraq.

Ricks covers familiar developments described in Bob Woodward’s The War
Within, but he sheds new light on the
role of General Ray Odierno in pushing
for a change of strategy. Specifically,
Ricks recounts how Odierno corresponded with his mentor and old boss,
retired general Jack Keane, to change
the “bridging strategy” then advocated
by Generals George Casey and John
Abizaid, and by the Pentagon leadership. Not wanting to lose this war on

Ricks describes in some detail how
events in al Anbar province greatly influenced a key aspect of the new strategy.
The Marines’ experience with the reconciliation movement, or “Sunni Awakening,” of tribal leaders in al Anbar in 2005
and 2006 was the pivotal instance showing how to turn former belligerents into
potential allies. In effect, the American
forces in al Anbar were already practicing the tactics and techniques of the new
counterinsurgency (COIN) manual
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recently published by General David
Petraeus and a Fort Leavenworth team.
Ricks highlights how Odierno adopted
this new COIN approach in the employment of the five surged combat brigades. Instead of putting all the
additional forces into central Baghdad
to “secure the people,” Odierno deployed them into the fractious “Baghdad belts.” During the surge, American
troops would not only live among the
Iraqi people in “joint security stations”
and combat outposts but also target the
insurgent lines of operations running
from Syria and Iran into central
Baghdad.
Overall, this appears to be a balanced
narrative of a war not yet finished. In
the last section Ricks considers the lasting effects of the “surge” strategy pursued in 2006–2008. He winds up with a
discussion of that famous Petraeus
question of 2003, “How does this end?”
Ricks notes that perhaps this war does
not end. Clausewitz declared, “Even the
ultimate outcome of war is not always
to be regarded as final”; in Ricks’s view,
that will be true of the outcome of this
war.
JON SCOTT LOGEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Deudney, Daniel H. Bounding Power: Republican
Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007.
391pp. $17.96

Paradoxically, this is one of the most
innovative yet least original books
written in the past decade on the theory and practice of international relations. Daniel Deudney synthesizes a

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss3/13

Such a reconciliation is the raison d’être
of republican security theory and practice, though as Deudney shows, the viability of the endeavor depends on
learning much from the school of hard
knocks. Twenty-five hundred years ago,
the members of the Delian League
sought to secure their independence
from Persia by following the leadership
of Athens, but in so doing they jumped
from the frying pan of external anarchy
into the fire of Athenian imperialism.
The Roman republic, if only because its
more inclusive approach to citizenship
enabled it to grow stronger as it expanded, proved more successful at uniting external security with internal
liberty than had Athens or the Delian
League, but ultimately it got too big.
Generals like Caesar, Pompey, and Augustus were able to count on the private
loyalty of soldiers to help them establish
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broad understanding of the history of
Western political theory with an
equally broad study of contemporary
world politics to recover what he calls
“republican security theory.” He sees
this theory as having developed from
the Greek polis through the Italian Renaissance to the Enlightenment (in the
thought of Montesquieu especially), to
the American founding to the present,
and as having important implications
for nuclear proliferation and disarmament in the “global village” of our
time. Deudney demonstrates conclusively that the leading schools of international relations today—realism and
liberal internationalism—are both intellectual “fragments” of this older tradition, with the fragmentation often
obstructing practical efforts to reconcile security from external threats to
the liberty of public citizens and private individuals.

